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LOGIC FOR A LIFETIMEDonald PerlisInstitute for Advanced Computer StudiesandDepartment of Computer ScienceUniversity of MarylandCollege Park, MD 207421 IntroductionThere has been an explosion of formal work in commonsense reasoning in the past fteenyears, largely in the specic area of nonmonotonic reasoning (NMR).1 This resulted in partfrom the observation [17] that human commonsense reasoning (CSR) often does not obeytraditional modes of logical inference. But Minsky may have misdiagnosed the source ofthe problem. He is right that traditional (monotonic) logic fails to model CSR, but I willargue that this is not so much due to an inherent nonmonotonicity in CSR as it is to theomniscience of traditional logic: all formulas that can be proven are in fact proven (madeinto theorems)|or, in model-theoretic terms, all semantic consequences of one's axioms arebelieved. Omniscience prevents proper treatment of change in belief; this theme will beelaborated in later sections.The problem of omniscience has not gone unnoticed by formalists. There is a standardattitude toward this, what I will call the standard model, a justication of the formal ap-proaches despite the known inappropriateness of omniscience. At a very high level (a moreprosaic and more revealing description is given later) it is this: omniscient formalisms havethe major advantage of being simpler and easier to study, and can be taken as modeling1E.g., witness the collections [6] and [8], the recurrent international NMR and KRR workshops, and inparticular the many beautiful discoveries by McCarthy, Reiter, Moore, Konolige, Levesque, Pearl, Halpern,and Lifschitz, among others. 2
ideal reasoners against which real (human or robotic) reasoners can be measured as approx-imations. The invitation to analogy with ideal gas laws and real gases is strong: we do learnuseful things about real gases from ideal gas models; in many situations a real gas behaves alot like an ideal gas. Whether a similar useful relation is obtains between ideal (omniscient)and real commonsense reasoners is the topic of this paper.There appear to be several pieces of evidence that this research tradition might notrelevantly address the issues facing the design of a real commonsense reasoner, not evenin useful approximation, and that omniscience is irreparably out of line with the needs ofany real reasoning agent.2 Here I present and discuss these pieces of evidence, as well astheir possible signicance for future formal directions, since this exploration also suggestsdesiderata that may very well be given useful formal treatment, but with a somewhat dierentset of aims from what has motivated much existing formal work.3 To a considerable extent,the paradigm suggested by Nilsson [18] of a robot with a lifetime of its own serves as anunderlying motivational theme.2 The standard modelWe begin with Minsky's (by now famous and overworked) examples [17] of two commonsensehuman inferences: from the information that Tweety is a bird, one may well infer that Tweetycan y; and yet if instead the reasoner had originally had the additional information thatTweety is an ostrich, the former inference would likely not have occurred and indeed insteadone may have inferred that Tweety cannot y. Thus more information may actually block aconclusion. This so (by now, at least) so obvious as to be a totally unsurprising observationabout human behavior, and by extension about intelligent robot behavior. But the clearconclusion is that traditional monotonic logic is not the proper vehicle for much of (human2This may account for the fact that those building commonsense reasoning systems (e.g., [21, 24, 22, 23,10, 27, 28, 7]) have availed themselves of only modest borrowings from traditional NMR formalisms.3Thus this is not at all an anti-logicist essay, but rather a call for yet further improved formalisms. TheNMR revolution of the 1980s was a real step forward in the liberation of logic from traditional settings andtoward greater realism about the nature of commonsense reasoning. We may now be in need of yet anotherrevolution. 3
or robot) commonsense reasoning.By 1980 at least three distinct formalisms for NMR had been developed [12, 25, 14], andthe standard model began to emerge. To present this model, we rst restate the examples inchronological terms: at rst we know Tweety is a bird and so conclude Tweety can y; laterwe learn Tweety is an ostrich, and so then retract our earlier conclusion. According to thestandard (nonmonotonic) model of reasoning (a folklore view that evolved in the early 1980s,but to my knowledge has never been carefully expressed in writing), commonsense reasoningconsists of an ongoing alternation of two kinds of symbolic manipulation: the CSR phase,during which defeasible theorems are proven from given commonsense axioms (beliefs), andtruth-maintenance phase (TMS, see [2]), during which the axiom set is updated based onnew incoming information (and theorems are retracted as needed). Then follows anotherround of CSR, then (if more data comes in) more TMS, etc.In the CSR phase, the reasoner's beliefs are precisely the set of all4 theorems (or semanticconsequences) emanating from the commonsense axioms (whatever the notion of proof orconsequence is). The kind of nonmonotonic eort by which the beliefs are produced is notgenerally examined; nor is the precise nature of the TMS update phase. But the formalrelation between the original belief (theorem/consequence) set and the new (post-update)belief set is given close attention for therein lies the nonmonotonicity and the judgement as towhether the appropriate \reasoning" has taken place. Thus in the case of Tweety, in phase 1(see Figure 1 below) the reasoner believes Tweety can y, since this follows nonmonotonicallyfrom the axiom that Tweety is a bird; in phase 1', the information that Tweety is an ostrich issupplied as a new axiom and the belief that Tweety can y is dropped, readying us for phase 2in which now the reasoner believes (this time perhaps from ordinary monotonic logic and thebackground knowledge that ostriches cannot y) that Tweety cannot y. The mechanismsof belief change are not of interest in the standard model, nor even the TMS phase which isgenerally not explicitly mentioned; rather only the formal relationship between phase 1 and4This is the omniscience: whatever follows is believed. Thus Fermat's Last Theorem is believed (if wecan believe Andrew Wiles!); and if we believe a contradiction then we believe everything whatsoever sinceeverything follows from that. 4
2, between 2 and 3, etc, is of interest.****************************************************************************phase: 1 1' 2 2' 3CSR | TMS | CSR | TMS | CSR | ...-------------?-------------|-------------?-------------|-------------?--belief set |update axioms| new beliefs |update axioms| new beliefs | ...etc etc-------------------> time(ignore the ?s for now)******************************* Figure 1 ***********************************The time taken to reason (i.e., the time spent in the CSR phases) can be ignored (all one'sbeliefs are instantaneously ready-to-hand); and inference (reasoning) shuts down during theTMS phase which merely inspects the proof trees to see what no longer has justicationunder the new axioms. In eect, the TMS phase transforms one theory (CSR belief set) intoa new one. Thus the course of nonmonotonic reasoning is seen as a succession of theories,each xed and perfect for its role as given by its associated axioms.The standard objection: resource limitations The usual (word-of-mouth) objection tothis model is that it is doubly impossible. Not only is it impossible for a real reasoner tohave an innite set of beliefs (as is usually required) but due to the nonmonotonicity, thebeliefs are not in general even computable from the axioms. Moreover, it takes time (andspace) to produce beliefs (theorems). Finally, from a contradiction we (people) do not cometo believe everything; we either do not notice the contradiction or we do and take remedialaction.The standard rejoinder: approximation The usual rejoinder is that the standard model5
is an idealization, that real reasoners can be seen as approximations to the ideal model, andeither (i) as technology produces faster computers the distinction will, for practical problems,fade away, or (ii) the distinction will remain a large but useful measure for comparing onerobot to another in terms of which comes closer to the ideal. And contradictory beliefs areunusual occurrences, not part of ordinary everyday reasoning.This quarrel can be pursued further; but I leave it here because I want to aim at a ratherdierent set of objections to the standard model.3 The standard model revisitedLooking again at the gure above, we see ?s in the separations between phases 1 and 1',between 2 and 2', and so on. These are to call our attention to these very crucial interfaces.Somehow the logic engine that produces defeasible beliefs in the CSR phase must cease doingso when new axioms come in, so that TMS can take place. Now since the standard modelsupposes CSR to be instantaneous, this is not a conceptual problem, and for a real (e.g.,human) reasoner, we can suppose that new data simply shuts o other trains of thought fora moment. But now comes a diculty.What is an axiom? How does a reasoner decide that new data is to be taken as axiomatic,trusted over other data? Aside from logical truths, what do we know for certain? Or howdo we prioritize our beliefs in order of believability? We clearly do, at least to some extent,since we often give up some beliefs in favor of others. However, some examples will showthat this is far from trivial.Suppose I watch the TV meteorologist in front of all her weather maps, saying that lastnight the temperature reached a low of one degree below zero, Fahrenheit. This is an expertopinion about an already measured datum, and is accepted by me without any apparentinferential steps. Then my four-year old son says that Bill Clinton is six feet 8 inches tall,and I reject this, thinking that (i) my son often exaggerates and (ii) if Clinton were thattall this surely would be frequently mentioned in the news and I would have heard about6
it again and again (yet I have never heard it except from my son). My belief that Clintonis less than six feet eight is clearly nonmonotonic (autoepistemic, to be precise) and myone-degree-below-zero belief is less clearly so. If the latter is to be considered defeasible,then which of our beliefs is not defeasible?Yet I would not be startled to learn that the meteorologist misread the temperature fromher notes, or that the thermomenter was broken, and that in fact the temperature last nightreached a low of only three degrees above zero. This is not such a shocking development.But it would be far more shocking, disturbing to my sense of how things work, to learn thatClinton is in fact six-eight.So, it appears that little indeed is axiomatic. When new data comes in, do we trust it?We go through some complicated reasoning, including assessments of how information aboutPresidents is reported, about how easily we remember things, and so on. That is, we usesubstantial portions of our commonsense world view: we do commonsense reasoning to helpassess whether to trust what we hear. So, we cannot turn the CSR inference engine o whilewe attach new axioms: we must keep the engine running.This is particularly the case when we are presented with contradictory data. Thus if wehear Tweety is an ostrich but we have already seen Tweety ying, we are not so quick todo the Minskian switch. We tend to trust our own eyes (Tweety is ying); but not always(maybe that bird is not Tweety). While there may well be formal priority principles here, ifso then they depend richly on the fabric of our overall world view and so cannot be relegatedto a TMS phase in which CSR is turned o: dealing with conicting data is part and parcelof what commonsense reasoning is all about.Finally, every timeTMS is called for in the standard model, there is a case of contradictionof a previous belief and a new datum. Thus contradictions are as common as is change ofbelief: it is contradictions that signal us that a change is needed, that it is time to rethinkour thinking. 7
4 Dealing with contradictionsHow can a reasoning apparatus (person, robot, program) deal with contradictions? Therehave been various proposals. Some, such as the paraconsistent logics surveyed in [1], aim toextract a trustworthy core of inferences while avoiding the contradictions. Others, such as[5, 15, 26], aim to detect and resolve contradictions. The latter are closer in spirit to theneeds we are addressing here.Unlike the traditional view that abhors a contradiction and seeks at all costs to avoidsuch5 and fears that CSR will come to naught (or to disaster) in their presence, the \new"view being presented here is that contradictions are our friends, guiding us to look moreclosely at what we are thinking. However, this is not to way that the problems are solvedby merely declaring an enemy to be a friend. New styles of formalism will be needed.5 Examples of ongoing and evolving reasoningIn this section we briey sketch several examples, illustrating the thesis that reasoning isnecessarily an ongoing process, not only for reasons of computational limitations but becauseof the nature of the beast. The standard model is inadequate to properly represent any ofthese examples of commonsense reasoning; it will simply be unable to include the indicatedinferences except in the presence of a contradiction, in which case because of omniscience italso sanctions all propositions as beliefs, thereby wiping out any useful distinctions on whichto base recovery.Language change It has been argued before [13, 19] that unlike the case of customaryxed formal languages, commonsense (or natural) language changes: new terms are coinedor learned, old terms change meanings, etc. The reasoner must be able to reason aboutthese changes, to incorporate them into her usage intelligently; and this involves notingtension (contradictions!) between usages. Noting that \John is tall" contradicts the personal5As I myself have done; see [20]. Also see the introduction to [8].8
observation that John is short, she starts to wonder whether these might be two dierentpersons named \John" (see [15]).Interpreting orders Your boss tells you (a personnel manager) never to hire high-schooldropouts. One day a job candidate comes to your oce. The interview goes ne and younote that he has a PhD. Then the next day you see that he in fact dropped out of highschool, drifted for a few years, then managed to get a BS, MS and PhD with a ne scholasticand employment record. Do you hire him or not? Commonsense says this not what yourboss meant by \HS dropout". But you are a little nervous because you realize that there isa clash of meanings, and you want to check it out with your boss.Taking advice Advice taking [11] involves trusting what others say. But they may contra-dict what you believe, and you need to realize this even of you do trust them, so you canremove the contradicted beliefs. This is not necessarily straightforward, since it may takesome reasoning to nd out the contradictions.Correcting misinformationYou are given the combination to a lock, but when you try it,it does not work: either you forgot it or was told it wrong. So, you do not give up in despair:you try variations, such as reversing the numbers. But this too involves rst noting a clashof beliefs, and remembering the wrong combination in order to vary it. Thus memory of old(untrusted) beliefs is important.This and the previous examples may lead the reader to think that it is the interaction ofour reasoner with other reasoners|i.e., a communication situation|that produces the needfor recognition of contradictions. The combination lock problem can easily be refashionedsolely in terms of a single reasoner; we leave this as an exercise and instead present below adierent single-agent example.Correcting perceptual errors You are walking in the woods and come across a log withan unusual growth of wildowers along one edge. Later on you see it again and decide youhave walked in a circle. But then you are not sure: is it the same log? The owers looklarger. You decide that it is not the same log and that you have not walked in a circle.9
This and the other examples above are cases of change of belief, what in the standardmodel goes on in the TMS phase (or in the interface between CSR and TMS phases). ButCSR is needed during this change, for it is precisely what the reasoner must rely upon toadjudicate between competing candidates for \axioms".6 ConclusionsCSR then is in large part the ability to keep a cool head in the face of confusing data,and to undertake eorts to sort through the data, resort to trial and error if need be,and come to useful conclusions. Recognition of confusion, stop-gap remedies (cease trustingcontradictands and closely-implicated data), and clarity-seeking by means of the rest of one'sdata, are central parts of an overall strategy. But detailed resolution of the confusion is highlydomain-specic and thus must be undertaken on the basis of either previous expertise, expertsupervision, or trial-and-error, while all the time making full use of the reasoning engine.Additions to the engine are done by the engine, not by a separate module while the engineis turned o or idling.Thus self-adjusting logics of confusion seem to be the order of the day. What form suchlogics may eventually take is far from clear. I note that OSCAR [21, 24, 22, 23] as wellas active (step) logics [4, 3, 5, 16, 9] are beginnings. It is clear that human commonsensereasoning involves many con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